This paper examines the status of naturalism in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and John Dewey. Despite the many points of overlap and agreement between Husserl’s and Dewey’s philosophical projects, there remains one glaring difference, namely, the place and status of naturalism in their approaches. For Husserl, naturalism is an enemy to be vanquished. For Dewey, naturalism is the only method that can put philosophy back in touch with the concerns of human beings. This paper will demonstrate the remarkable similarities (...) between Husserl’s and Dewey’s thought before contending that Dewey’s “naturalistic humanism” offers a conception of naturalism which is compatible with Husserlian phenomenology. Furthermore, reading these two philosophers together, this paper argues, can point the way forward to a naturalism which avoids the dismissal of the contributions made by knowing subjects carried out by dominant contemporary strains of reductive naturalism. (shrink)

Most debate about the ethical implications of modern biotechnology has centred around medical issues, but public concerns over the impact of agricultural biotechnologies have gathered momentum. This volume, resulting from the 55th University of Nottingham Easter School in Agricultural and Food Science, provides a survey of this new field of enquiry. The book will be of interest to a wide readership, including applied philosophers, sociologists, economists and ecologists, as well as biotechnologists and agricultural and food scientists.

This book offers glimpses into the personal and scholarly lives of 20 giants in the history of psychology. As in the earlier volumes, prominent scholars were invited to prepare chapters on a pioneer who had made important contributions in their own area of expertise. Some of the psychologists described may be the teachers of the instructors who will be the users of this book, potentially providing a personal connection of the pioneers to the students. A special section provides brief portraits (...) of the editors and authors, containing interesting information about the relationship between the pioneers and the psychologists who describe them. Utilizing an informal, personal, sometimes humorous, style of writing, the book will appeal to students and instructors interested in the history of psychology. Each of the five volumes in this series contains different profiles thereby bringing more than 100 of the pioneers in psychology more vividly to life. (shrink)

This third volume in a series devoted to luminaries in the history of psychology--features chapter authors who are themselves highly visible and eminent scholars. They provide glimpses of the giants who shaped modern cognitive and behavioral science, and shed new light on their contributions and personalities, often with a touch of humor or whimsy and with fresh personal insights. The animated style, carefully selected details, and lively perspective make the people, ideas, and controversies in the history of psychology come alive. (...) The fields touched on in this and other volumes cover all of the subfields of psychology. As such, all volumes of _Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology_ will be of interest to psychologists, as well as scholars in related fields. The resourceful teacher could use a selection of chapters as supplementary readings to enhance almost any course in the discipline. The major purpose of these books is to provide source materials for students and their teachers in undergraduate and graduate courses in the history of psychology. Each of the five volumes in this series contains different profiles thereby bringing more than 100 of the pioneers in psychology more vividly to life. (shrink)

The study of conversational humor has received relatively little empirical attention with almost no examinations of the role of vocal signals in spontaneous humor production. Here we report an analysis of spontaneous humorous speech in a rural Brazilian collective farm. The sample was collected over the course of ethnographic fieldwork in northeastern Brazil, and is drawn specifically from the monthly communal business meetings conducted in Portuguese. Our analyses focused on humorous utterances identified by the subsequent presence of laughter. Acoustic features (...) of these utterances were compared to non-humorous utterances by the same speakers of similar length and immediately preceding them to look for prosodic contrasts. This corpus provided a unique opportunity for examining the way people mark their humorous productions in a non-humorous environment. Contrary to the notion that speakers must mark their production of humor in order to facilitate audience understanding, no significant marking of a joking “frame” was detected across a range of acoustic dimensions. The only consistent difference — that the set-up and punch line segments were louder than baseline speech before it — does not well support a marking hypothesis and more likely reflects speaker adjustments to the acoustic conditions of the meeting hall. We present these data from the perspective of the encryption theory of humor that predicts speakers will not generally mark spontaneous, conversational humor in most contexts. (shrink)

Motivated reasoning occurs when we reason differently about evidence that supports our prior beliefs than when it contradicts those beliefs. Adult participants (N = 377) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system completed written responses critically evaluating strengths and weaknesses in a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). The vignette had two fictional scientists present prototypical arguments for and against anthropogenic climate change that were constructed with equally flawed and conflicting reasoning. The current study tested and found support (...) for three main hypotheses: cognitive style, personality, and ideology would predict both motivated reasoning and endorsement of human caused climate change; those who accept human-caused climate change will be less likely to engage in biased reasoning and more likely to engage in objective reasoning about climate change than those who deny human activity as a cause of climate change. (144 words). (shrink)

In their article, Mehr et al. conclude that the design features of music are consistent with adaptations for credible signaling. Although appealing to design may seem like a plausible basis for identifying adaptations, probing adaptive theories of music must be done at the genomic level and will require a functional understanding of the genomic, phenotypic, and fitness properties of music.

For much of his life, Saint Augustine was preoccupied with concerns related to the freedom of the In.mm will. If one traces his view of the human will throughout his life, one notices a significant development. In his early writings against the Manichaeans he maintained that the origin of evil can be traced to evil choice. At the very end of his life he came to defend the position that the human will did not have the ability to turn to (...) God apart from divine intervention. In this study I demonstrate that Augustine’s view of the freedom of the human will underwent a significant development during the first decade after his conversion to Christianity. To demonstrate this, I outline his position as it is found in his works during three periods within this decade. The first period, before his ordination, is the period in which he held that the human will has the freedom of indifference. In other words, it is possible for an individual to turn to God or to refuse to turn regardless of divine intervention. The second period, after his ordination and before his episcopacy, is the period in which, although still holding to the freedom of indifference, Augustine recognized to a much greater degree the struggle in the human will. The third period is his early years as bishop. During this time, Augustine held that it is impossible for an individual to turn to God without divine intervention and it is impossible to refuse to turn, if such intervention was granted. Finally, I briefly sketch three possible influences on this development. First, I show that it was Augustine’s study of the scriptures which was, probably, the principal influence. Next, I discuss how his own moral and spiritual struggle may have helped him realize the difficulty of making right moral choices. The third possible influence was his attempt at reforming the moral and spiritual lives of those in his congregation. These three factors may have helped Augustine recognize that it is only with the aid of divine intervention that an individual can turn to God. (shrink)

A social insurance scheme against a short life seems impossible: ex ante (before lengths of life are known), it is hard to identify the persons who will be short-lived, and ex post (once lengths of life are known), it is often too late to compensate the short-lived. However, it is possible to insure persons against a short life by means of age-based statistical discrimination that favours the young in line with the Herod strategy: allocating the good things of life to (...) all young adults improves the situation of the unidentified persons who will die prematurely and reduces the deprivation due to an early death. This article examines three challenges questioning the capacity of the Herod strategy to reduce wellbeing deprivation due to a premature death. First, the limited substitutability between the quantity and the quality of life years makes an efficient insurance scheme against a short life incomplete. Second, the state cannot know ex ante the conception of the good life of the short-lived and must offer baskets of universal means that would improve all kinds of short lives. Such baskets will, under endowment effects, affect the adopted views about the good life, against the ideal of a neutral state. Third, the bias towards the future makes persons spontaneously reallocate the good things of life to later ages, which would defeat insurance against a short life. (shrink)

Culture, Not Politics We live in a politicized time. Culture wars and increasingly partisan conflicts have reduced public discourse to shouting matches between ideologues. But rather than merely bemoaning the vulgarity and sloganeering of this era, says acclaimed author and editor Gregory Wolfe, we should seek to enrich the language of civil discourse. And the best way to do that, Wolfe believes, is to draw nourishment from the deepest sources of culture: art and religious faith. Wolfe has been called (...) “one of the most incisive and persuasive voices of our generation,” and this penetrating and wide-ranging book makes a powerful case for the importance of beauty and imagination to cultural renewal. He begins by tracing his own journey from a young culture warrior bent on attacking the modern world to a career devoted to nurturing the creation of culture through contemporary literature and art that renew the Western tradition. Along the way, Wolfe finds in Renaissance Christian humanists like Erasmus and Thomas More—and their belief that imagination and the arts are needed to offset the danger of ideological abstractions— a “distant mirror” in which to see our own times. Beauty Will Save the World offers a revealing introduction to the artists and thinkers who are the Christian humanists of the modern era, from well-known figures like Evelyn Waugh and Wendell Berry to lesser-known authors like Shusaku Endo, Andrew Lytle, and Geoffrey Hill. A section on visual artists Mary McCleary, Fred Folsom, and Makoto Fujimura (accompanied by reproductions of their works) demonstrates that there are artists who can reimagine the Western tradition in strikingly contemporary terms. Finally, Wolfe pays tribute to the conservative thinkers who served as his mentors: Russell Kirk, Gerhart Niemeyer, Marion Montgomery, and Malcolm Muggeridge— all of whom rejected rigid ideology and embraced culture and tradition. At a time when our public discourse has come to be dominated by warring factions with little regard for truth, Wolfe's affirmation of beauty as a redemptive force is both refreshing and encouraging. (shrink)

Crash Course in Logic is a booklet designed to introduce basic principles of logic and critical thinking to students so they can better express their ideas. Many high school and college students have trouble constructing theoretical arguments and writing clearly because they are not acquainted with the forms of reasoning that are presented in this booklet. Intended as a supplement to other instructional material for a variety of courses, this booklet will guide students through a mini-course on logic that includes (...) many examples and exercises. With knowledge of the basic forms of reasoning, students will have the tools necessary to solve problems and evaluate arguments as well as articulate their own ideas and insights clearly. Crash Course in Logic will be of great value to teachers of any subject who are searching for an accessible way to teach critical thinking and reasoning to their students. (shrink)

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. when grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about (...) one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers. (shrink)

Why do we need government? A common view is that government is necessary to constrain people's conduct toward one another, because people are not sufficiently virtuous to exercise the requisite degree of control on their own. This view was expressed perspicuously, and artfully, by liberal thinker James Madison, in The Federalist, number 51, where he wrote: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Madison's idea is shared by writers ranging across the political spectrum. It finds clear expression in (...) the Marxist view that the state will gradually wither away after a communist revolution, as unalienated “communist man” emerges. And it is implied by the libertarian view that government's only legitimate function is to control the unfortunate and immoral tendency of some individuals to violate the moral rights of others. (shrink)

In a pioneering book, Philosophy of Microbiology, Maureen O’Malley argues for the philosophical importance of microbes through an examination of their impact on ecosystems, evolution, biological classification, collaborative behavior, and multicellular organisms. She identifies many understudied conceptual issues in the study of microbes. If philosophers follow her lead, the philosophy of biology will be expanded and enriched.

The release of genetically engineered organisms into the shared environment raises scientific, ethical, and societal issues. Using some form of democratic deliberation to provide the public with a voice on the policies that govern these technologies is important, but there has not been enough attention to how we should connect public deliberation to the existing regulatory process. Drawing on lessons from previous public deliberative efforts by U.S. federal agencies, we identify several practical issues that will need to be addressed if (...) relevant federal agencies are to undertake public deliberative activities to inform decision‐making about gene editing in the wild. We argue that, while agencies may have institutional capacity to undertake public deliberative activities, there may not be sufficient political support for them to do so. Advocates of public deliberation need to make a stronger case to Congress about why federal agencies should be encouraged and supported to conduct public deliberations. (shrink)

Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...) the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won’t win either—indeed, it is rational to accept for any individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won’t win, accepting that ticket 2 won’t win, . . . , and accepting that ticket 1000 won’t win entails that it is rational to accept that no ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no ticket wins. (shrink)

The following three related contributions jointly serve to lift up elements of the thought of the anthropolo­gist Gregory Bateson that can be fruitfully compared with elements of Michael Polanyi’s thought. In a brief introduction, William Stillwell reviews Bateson’s life and developing interests. Stillwell also provides, in a creative dialog form akin to Bateson’s own dialogs, a short review article on Noel Charlton’s Understanding Gregory Bateson: Mind, Beauty and the Sacred Earth. The third piece is Jere Moorman’s short 1991 (...) essay (now out of print) discussing Polanyi’s ideas about tacit knowing and their connection with Bateson’s ideas about the double bind. (shrink)

The patient was a woman in her 30s who, until the rapid progression of an ultimately fatal neurologic disease, had been a very successful professional, enjoying athletics and an active social life. In the 6 months of swift deterioration, she had gone from being extremely vibrant and energetic to being totally unable to care for her personal needs. There had been no loss of intellectual capacity. Her sister later recounted to Dr. J., the emergency department physician, that she had found (...) the patient unconscious and unresponsive at home and had immediately called the patient's neurologist in a neighboring city. He directed her to call the paramedics. (shrink)

This paper argues the case that tests of how investors value corporate social performance (CSP) based upon realised stock market returns are liable to be weak tests if markets are efficient and firms change CSP policies infrequently. We provide a theoretical explanation of why this will be the case using examples to illustrate. Subsequently, we set out an alternative theoretical framework for the purposes of investigating whether markets place a positive, or a negative, valuation on CSP, and show why this (...) is superior to tests based upon Tobin’s Q. Using US KLD data, we demonstrate that, as theorised, markets place a positive value on CSP that is not detected by conventional returns-based tests. Our conclusion is that researchers who are interested in the question of whether engagement with a corporate social responsibility agenda is a value-enhancing activity for a company (as argued by some stakeholder theorists) or value destructive (as argued by Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, The New York Times Magazine, 1970), need to look beyond returns-based tests to answer the research question posed. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It (...) will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations. (shrink)

This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...) will deal with the first of these questions. Special attention will be paid to identifying what it was that prevented Carnap from defining a truth predicate for descriptive languages in Syntax. Section 2 of this paper will deal with the question of Carnap's attitude towards reference and ontology in Syntax. It will be shown that the attempt in Syntax to address ontological questions is seriously defective. Section 3 of this paper addresses the last of the questions posed above. It is argued that in the light of what is established in Sections 1 and 2, Carnap could not have retained the position of Syntax with respect to truth and reference. (shrink)

Responding to volatile criticisms frequently leveled at Leo Strauss and those he influenced, the prominent contributors to this volume demonstrate the profound influence that Strauss and his students have exerted on American liberal democracy and contemporary political thought. By stressing the enduring vitality of classic books and by articulating the theoretical and practical flaws of relativism and historicism, the contributors argue that Strauss and the Straussians have identified fundamental crises of modernity and liberal democracy.

The contributors to The Moral of the Story, all preeminent political theorists, are unified by their concern with the instructive power of great literature. This thought-provoking combination of essays explores the polyvalent moral and political impact of classic world literatures on public ethics through the study of some of its major figures-including Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes, Jane Austen, Henry James, Joseph Conrad, Robert Penn Warren, and Dostoevsky. Positing the uniqueness of literature's ability to promote dialogue on salient moral and intellectual virtues, (...) editor Henry T. Edmonson III has culled together a wide-ranging exploration of such fundamental concerns as the abuse of authority, the nature of good leadership, the significance of "middle class virtues" and the needs of adolescents. This collection reinvigorates the study of classic literature as an endeavor that is not only personally intellectually satisfying, but also an inimitable and unique way to enrich public discourse. (shrink)

Death is the destiny we all share, and this will not change. Yet the way we die, which had remained the same for many generations, has changed drastically in a relatively short time for those in developed countries with access to healthcare. For generations, if people were lucky enough to reach old age, not having died in infancy or childhood, in childbirth, in war, or by accident, they would take to bed, surrounded by loved ones who cared for them, and (...) fade into death. Most likely, they would have seen their parents and grandparents die the same way, and so this manner of dying would be familiar: it was part of the natural cycle of life. Now less than 25 per cent of Americans die at home, having reached much older ages than people would have dreamed of in past generations, often after surviving many illnesses and even diseases that would have been terminal for their grandparents. We are fortunate to live (and die) today, supported by myriad scientific, medical, and technological advancements, however we also face new problems as a result of the new way in which we die. We can no longer anticipate a peaceful waning at home with family. We know our lives will likely end in hospitals likely after we have endured grueling treatments to prolong life. We have to decide what decisions we want our loved ones, or care-givers, to make when we cannot choose for ourselves. We have to think about whether in any circumstances we would seek physician-assisted death. We know we face other questions as well, but we may not even know where to start. In the face of these decisions, we can feel daunted and afraid. The best remedy is information and planning. In this book, Gregory Eastwood - a physician who has cared for dying patients, served as an ethics consultant, and taught end of life issues to medical and other health profession students - draws from his substantial experience with patients and families to provide the information that will help us think clearly about the choices and issues we will face at the end of our own lives, and when faced with the deaths of our loved ones. With sensitivity and profound insight, Eastwood guides us through all the important questions about death and dying in straightforward, clear language, enhanced by real-life stories. Throughout, he shows us how we can take ownership of the way we want to die, when we must die, and feel more in control as death approaches. (shrink)

Our experience of narrative has an internal and an external aspect--the content of the narrative’s representations, and its intentional, communicative aetiology. The interaction of these two things is crucial to understanding how narrative works. I begin by laying out what I think we can reasonably expect from a narrative by way of causal information, and how causality interacts with other attributes we think of as central to narrative. At a certain point this discussion will strike a problem: our judgements about (...) what is a relevant possibility within the narrative’s story depend on our judgements of probability; but these latter judgements depend, in turn, on factors external to the world of the story, and cannot be explained in terms of causal relations available within the story. We need the external, author-centred perspective at this point. These different perspectives, the internal and the external, correspond to different types of explanations we may give of events in a story; I call these internal and external explanations. I show how these different explanations are made use of in two contrasting arthistorical projects. I use these examples as the basis for a generalisation about the structure of the two explanatory forms. Finally, I suggest some ways in which explanations of these two kinds relate to one another, and to our thinking when we are engaged by a narrative. (shrink)

Remapping Biology with Goethe, Schelling, and Herder recruits a Romantic philosophy of biology into contemporary debates to both integrate the theoretical implications of ecology, evolution, and development, and to contextualize the successes of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis's gene's-eye-view of biology. The dominant philosophy of biology in the twentieth century was one developed within and for the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. As biologists like those developing an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis have pushed the limits of this paradigm, fresh philosophical approaches have become necessary. (...) This book makes the case that an organicism developed by the 19th century figures Goethe, Schelling, and Herder offers surprising resources to navigate the contemporary biological and evolutionary terrain. This "metamorphic organicism" resonates with present trends in biological theory that emphasize process, organismal dynamics, ecology, and agency. It also proposes strategies for reintegrating reductive and mechanistic maps of biology, like those of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, into richer theoretical representations of life. Drawing from cutting-edge biology, Romantic history, and perspectival pluralist literatures, this integrated history-and-philosophy-of-biology will be of interest to students and scholars interested in the genesis of current theoretical tensions in evolutionary biology, and to those seeking constructive ways to resolve those tensions, including practicing biologists and educators. (shrink)

Psychophysical scaling models of the form R = f, with R the response and I some intensity of an attribute, all assume that people judge the amounts of an attribute. With simple biases excepted, most also assume that judgments are independent of space, time, and features of the situation other than the one being judged. Many data support these ideas: Magnitude estimations of brightness increase with luminance. Nevertheless, I argue that the general model is wrong. The stabilized retinal image literature (...) shows that nothing is seen if light does not change over time. The classification literature shows that dimensions often combine to produce emergent properties that cannot be described by the elements in the stimulus. These and other effects cannot be adjusted for by simply adding variables to the general model because some factors do not combine linearly. The proposed alternative is that people initially judge the entire stimulus – the object in terms of its environment. This agrees with the constancy literature that shows that objects and their attributes are identified through their relations to other aspects of the scene. That the environment determines judgments is masked in scaling studies where the standard procedure is to hold context constant. In a typical brightness study the essential stimulus might be the intensity of the light or a difference between the light and the background. The two are perfectly confounded. This issue is examined in the case of audition. Judgments of the loudness of a tone depend on how much that tone differs from the previous tone in both pitch and loudness. To judge loudness people first seem to process the stimulus object in terms of differences between it and other aspects in the situation; only then do they assess the feature of interest. Psychophysical judgments will therefore be better interpreted by theories of attention that are based in biology or psychology than those that are based in classical physics. (shrink)

Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ is generally seen as overturning Carnap’s epistemological picture of mathematics and the sciences. However, I wish to stress how this paper grew out of arguments not having anything to do with large-scale epistemological concerns, but ones originally presented against quantified modal logic. Quine thought he could demonstrate the impossibility of adding anything like ordinary quantification to modal logic, but Barcan Marcus did exactly this. In fact, as I will argue, ‘Two Dogmas ...’ can be seen (...) as growing out of a 1947 paper of Quine’s where Barcan Marcus is the explicit target. Later, in certain exchanges with Quine, Barcan Marcus puts forward and defends a consistent and interesting position on matters of ontology and the philosophy of language. This chapter will examine Barcan Marcus’s role in both the debate over analyticity and the debate on (meta-)ontology. (shrink)

John Dewey looks to the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle for the general outlines of his ethical thought. In his 1932 Ethics, he describes the ethical framework that he shares with Aristotle in terms of knowledge, choice and character: "The formula was well stated by Aristotle. The doer of the moral deed must have a certain 'state of mind' in doing it. First, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself, and thirdly, (...) the act must be the expression of a formed and stable character."1 This paper examines the interaction of these elements within Aristotle's and Dewey's ethical thought. In particular, it discusses the idea of the good as a link between the character virtues and practical deliberation. It will show how this idea of the good that guides practical deliberation is also an expression of one's character virtues. (shrink)

I attempt to find an adequate answer to the two following basic issues of an ethics of belief: How do we determine what we ought to believe? What dispositions and abilities ought one to develop in order to lead a responsible "doxastic life"? I consider first how the traditional but still predominant view is in need of a radical revision and then propose a new and more promising pragmatic position. ;In an introductory chapter I elucidate the scope, richness, and contemporary (...) relevance of the above issues. In the second chapter I show the inadequacy of the "epistemicist" ethics of belief. This view assumes the ideal of the epistemically responsible believer and holds that the only legitimate justification for any belief comes from an epistemic point of view. I argue that the restriction to epistemic considerations, goals, and virtues is unwarranted, and that even the most flexible recent versions of this tradition are not without difficulties. ;In third chapter I consider the alternative view of William James. I argue that this view avoids many of the pitfalls of the epistemic tradition. Convinced that the views of William James on the ethics of belief have not been given their due, I try to develop a treatment of the topic that goes beyond the usual discussions of "The Will to Believe" and considers all of James' published and unpublished manuscripts. James' view suggests that a pragmatists needs to be committed to a "situation" ethics of belief. James also takes us in the direction of a more inclusive ideal, a more promising and flexible understanding of rationality. ;In the final chapter, I propose a basic sketch of a pragmatist position which goes beyond James and is nurtured by the insights of John Dewey. I first consider what are the fundamental differences between the traditional view presented in Chap II and a general pragmatic approach to the issues of the ethics of belief. Then, in the remainder of the chapter, I examine the plausibility of complementing the situation approach with a virtue approach. Pragmatism is presented as taking a positive stand on what constitutes an ideal believer and its ideal community or way of life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard Price, the Debate on Free Will, and Natural RightsGregory I. MolivasWhen Richard Price projected metaphysical assumptions onto his ethical theory, he elaborated a conception of man as a normatively self-regulating being. Endowed with rationality, man is a “law unto himself.” Price’s political writings postulated accordingly that man should be his own legislator. The first proposition appeared in his ethics in the context of man’s identification with his higher (...) faculties, and the second in the context of man considered as a member of civil society. Crucial to the transition from the first context to the second was Price’s notion of man’s inward constitution as permeating his conception of practical virtue, a view he expanded in his discussion on free will. This conception was built on a sharp contrast between reason and passion, which he described in terms of a relationship like that of sovereign to subject. The contrast is between those faculties which are destined to command, and those who ought to obey. This analogy facilitated comparison with normative relationships obtaining in civil society, where Price identified subservience to passion with obedience to an external-to-the-“self “ power, which in a political context manifested as the wishes of other people.These successive steps from ethical supposition to political claims, formed a body of assumptions underlying beliefs that were shared by many of his contemporaries. They did not constitute a unified system of principles, and it is vain to seek theoretical consistency in all those who seemed to have espoused ideas similar to those of Price. His assumptions do, however, help to explain why some of his contemporaries found his ideas familiar or self-evident, while to others they were incomprehensible. Nor is it a coincidence that Price’s most able critics happened to be psychological determinists (Richard Hey, John Lind, Edmund Burke), who attacked his conception of political liberty after undermining, or disputing, Price’s conception of man. [End Page 105]I. In the writings of all those who inveighed against the rights of man, the words “natural rights” and “metaphysics” are often found together. Thomas Paine was accused of having “crudely stolen” his “crazy metaphysics” from others, 1 and studies of Edmund Burke have continuously pointed to his dislike of the “professor of metaphysics.” Burke’s aversion to abstract speculation and metaphysics has often been interpreted as the natural reaction of an English politician confronting the generalities of continental writers. Frederick Dreyer, however, argues that when Burke wrote his Reflections, he had in mind Price’s philosophical arguments rather than the events of the French Revolution. 2 According to him, the anonymous “metaphysician” whom Burke so often and so vehemently denounced was, in fact, Richard Price.In substantiating his position Dreyer quotes, among other things, a revealing passage from Burke: “There are people who have split and anatomized the doctrine of free government, as if it were an abstract question concerning metaphysical liberty and necessity, and not a matter of moral prudence and natural feeling.” 3 Although Dreyer does not pursue the full implications of the evidence he presents, this is a remarkable statement, because it indicates what Price had undertaken in his political writings. In his philosophical works Price had defended the idea of metaphysical or philosophical liberty as a precondition of moral agency. In the first and most important theoretical section of his influential Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, 4 which set out to analyze the nature of liberty, Price summarized his earlier philosophical views. As William King noted in this section of his political pamphlet Price was “totally out in his philosophy.” 5Price defined liberty as the power of self-government and approached it through its four general divisions: physical liberty, moral, religious, and civil liberty. Commentators on Price have often acknowledged that his conception of liberty, as expounded in his political pamphlet, is indebted to his earlier philosophical work and notably his Review of the Principal Questions in Morals; 6 but they have not followed up with a clear exposition of how the divisions of liberty Price put forward in his Observations are related. [End Page 106]Although J. C. D. Clark claims that... (shrink)

Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs constitute an important counter-example to the widely accepted theses that we ought not and cannot believe at will. Cases of self-fulfilling belief are thought to constitute a special class where we enjoy the epistemic freedom to permissibly believe for pragmatic reasons, because whatever we choose to believe will end up true. In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim of (...) believing what is true. While one cannot usually fail to establish that one will acquire a true belief without establishing the truth of the believed proposition, in the case self-fulfilling belief the two can come apart. I argue that insofar as the aim of belief has to do with determining whether the believed proposition is true, it will be both impossible and impermissible to believe for pragmatic reasons. (shrink)

The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. (...) The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer. (shrink)

An analysis of phaedo 96c-606c seeks to demonstrate that when forms are cited as either "safe" or "clever" aitiai they are not meant to function as either final or efficient causes, But as logico-Metaphysical essences which have no causal efficacy whatever, But which do have definite (and far-Reaching) implications for the causal order of the physical universe, For it is assumed that a causal statement, Such as "fire causes heat" will be true if, And only if, The asserted physical bond (...) between fire and heat instantiates the eternal and logically necessary relation of entailment between the instantiated forms, Fire, Heat. (shrink)

From 1953 to 1959 Gödel worked on a response to Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. The drafts display Gödel’s familiarity with Carnap’s position from The Logical Syntax of Language, but they received a dismissive reaction on their eventual, posthumous, publication. Gödel’s two principal points, however, will here be defended. Gödel, though, had wished simply to append a few paragraphs to show that the same arguments apply to Carnap’s later views. Carnap’s position, however, had changed significantly in the intervening years, and to (...) a significant extent, this mature position realizes much of what Gödel himself wanted out of a philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) utilises nuclear transfer technology to replace defective mitochondria with healthy ones and thereby minimise the risk of a mitochondrial disease passing from a mother to her child. It promises much but comes with ethical controversy, significant risk of harm and many unknowns. Forming a position on MRT requires accurate information about the current state of knowledge, and an appreciation of the ethical issues at stake. Ethical deliberations will vary depending on the framework used. There are in (...) principle objections to MRT on the grounds of direct harm to human embryos and germline genetic modification. But even without these objections MRT can be weighed in terms of the balance between risks and benefits, alternatives and uncertainties. This paper explores the evidence and lays out the relevant issues to assist such a deliberation. (shrink)

My double aim in this paper is to argue for the claims that, when they are formed in certain ways, some judgements expressed by “I am here now” are both (a) apriori (although not solely in virtue of their meaning), and (b) necessary (albeit trivially so). I will submit that such judgements are “analytic” in the same sense that some judgements are “immune to error through misidentification” when this notion is understood in a relativistic way: in both cases, no component (...) of the content determines the referents upon which the truth of the corresponding judgement depends. I will attempt to show that, beyond conventionally-analytic sentences which are supposed to be (known apriori to be) true just in virtue of (knowledge of their) meaning, there are also contextually-analytic judgements that are (known apriori to be) true in virtue of (apriori knowledge of the) reflexive relation between the context of the judgement and the circumstance of evaluation which it targets. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scholars of Bonaventure's thought labor under the difficulty that the Seraphic Doctor is more widely admired than read. Yet there is one advantage they may claim: the immense popularity down through the centuries of his magnum opus: the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, "The Journey of the Mind to God." The text is poetic, concise, and dense. It summarizes many points in Bonaventure's philosophy, theology, and spirituality – indeed, it (...) has sometimes been called a summa of his spiritual theology.In the present essay, I offer a proposal for reading the Itinerarium. I do so with two types of readers in mind. One is the Bonaventure scholar, for whom I make certain arguments concerning the logic of the text and its relationship to other works of Bonaventure. The other is the non-specialist who wishes to teach the Itinerarium as a significant part of the Christian theological patrimony. To the latter, I offer a schematic to understand the different elements of the text in their relationship to each other. This guided reading will, I hope, help the teacher to present the scientific power of Bonaventure's theology.I. Preliminary NoteMy preliminary claim is that the Itinerarium is best understood as divided into two trajectories: one involves the three stages of seeing God through the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul; the other involves the three stages of seeing God in the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul. This claim might be criticized by readers of the text. Bonaventure gives several possibilities for understanding the structure of the text in the first part of chapter 1, and does not state that one should be privileged above the others. However, as he goes on to explain each stage, the division that keeps reappearing is that of seeing God through and in the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul. I therefore regard that division as the most significant. In what follows, I first examine certain antecedents to the Itinerarium's structural argument in earlier works of Bonaventure. I then outline the first trajectory, highlighting its similarities and differences with those earlier works, and then the second trajectory, highlighting its uniqueness and proposing a key by which it may be understood. I close with a brief statement of the significance of my reading in light of some recent scholarship.For reference, one may use the following chart, delineating the trajectories.Knowing God through Knowing God inwhat is below the soul chap. 1: the consideration of God through his vestiges in the universe chap. 2: the consideration of God in his vestiges in this visible worldthe soul chap. 3: the consideration of God through his image imprinted on our natural powers chap. 4: the consideration of God in his image reformed through the gifts of gracewhat is above the soul chap. 5: the consideration of the divine unity through its primary name which is Being chap. 6: the consideration of the most blessed Trinity in its name which is the GoodII. Antecedents to This Kind of Consideration of GodA) Knowing God through and inThe distinction between seeing God through and in is not unique to the Itinerarium. It occurs earlier, in the Commentary on the Sentences, in two places. Though the contexts and the language are slightly different, the content of the distinction is the same. To know God through creatures is "to be raised from the knowledge of the creature to the knowledge of God as by way of a intermediate ladder." To know God in creatures is rather to know "his presence and influence in the creature." Bonaventure says further that knowing God through creatures is characteristic of wayfarers, and is a knowledge that is.. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Tractatus has generated many interpretations since its publication in 1921, but over the years a consensus has developed concerning its criticisms of Russell's philosophy. In Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell, Gregory Landini draws extensively from his work on Russell's unpublished manuscripts to show that the consensus characterises Russell with positions he did not hold. Using a careful analysis of Wittgenstein's writings he traces the 'Doctrine of Showing' and the 'fundamental idea' of the Tractatus to Russell's logical atomist research program, (...) which dissolves philosophical problems by employing variables with structure. He argues that Russell and his apprentice Wittgenstein were allies in a research program that makes logical analysis and reconstruction the essence of philosophy. His sharp and controversial study will be essential reading for all who are interested in this rich period in the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This is a reply to Weinfurt's article examining the Sweeping Model. Overall, our positions are not as incompatible as they may seem, although I feel that his conclusion, that the Sweeping Model cannot explain human attention, does not follow from his comments. I will proceed through his article and clarify issues as they arise. Our difference of opinion may result from differing goals, with Weinfurt being concerned with more abstract aspects of cognition, and myself with basic perception and how it (...) may be achieved before proceeding to the more abstract. (shrink)

What sort of moral theory should we view Saint Anselm of Canterbury as holding and using in his writings? In this paper, I argue that Anselm is best understood as a virtue ethicist. In the first part of the paper, I consider whether his approach could be understood in terms of deontological or natural law theories. In the second, I make a case for Anselm being a virtue ethicist. In the third part, I focus on this theme as found in (...) treatises published during Anselm’s lifetime. In the fourth, I look at other texts within the Anselmian corpus, notably the De humanibus moribus and the Dicta Anselmi. In the fifth and sixth parts, I turn to Anselm’s letters, focusing first on general discussions, and then on discussions focused upon specific virtues and vices. -/- . (shrink)

Stoicism, a philosophy and set of practices developed in ancient times, commands ever-growing interest. Its present day, students, practitioners, teachers, and scholars adapt it to the challenges of modern life. This third volume brings together fifty pieces previously published in the Stoicism Today blog, ranging from personal essays to conference presentations, from bits of practical advice to history and interpretation, from polemics to symposia grappling with controversies, key issues, and central concepts. There is something for everyone in this volume. The (...) selections in this volume range over a vast array of topics. You will encounter authors applying Stoicism to parenting, medicine, psychotherapy, culinary arts, time-management, exercise and fitness, the emotions, relationships, the workplace, and the environment. Some selections examine useful practices, the nature and scope of the virtues, how to develop equanimity, resilience, and happiness. Comparative studies bring Stoicism into connection with Buddhism, mindfulness, self-help and productivity authors, and modalities of psychotherapy. This book bridges the gaps between philosophical reflection and practical wisdom, between study and interpretation of Stoicism, and its application to present-day issues and problems. The essays in this volume speak to anyone intending to start or to deepen a thoughtful Stoic life in the modern world. (shrink)

This paper is a study of Kierkegaard’s concept of despair. The Danish etymology of fortvivleslse is examined in order to argue that, for Kierkegaard, despair is not simply a feeling, but is more fundamentally a willed misrelation in the self.

What is the relationship between religious studies and theology? Do both have a place within the university? This paper will argue that no clear distinction can be drawn between religious studies and theology on the level of the methods they employ. Each is multidisciplinary and each is able to address questions of religious truth. They can be distinguished only by asking `What is the question which each is attempting to answer?'. Religious studies addresses the question of the meaning and truth (...) of any religion. Theology is interested in the question of the meaning and truth of one particular faith. By adopting the language of one particular faith, the theologian is able to explore particular religious questions in some depth. (shrink)

Microbial ecology is flourishing, and in the process, is making contributions to how the ecology and biology of large organisms is understood. Ongoing advances in sequencing technology and computational methods have enabled the collection and analysis of vast amounts of molecular data from diverse biological communities. While early studies focused on cataloguing microbial biodiversity in environments ranging from simple marine ecosystems to complex soil ecologies, more recent research is concerned with community functions and their dynamics over time. Models and concepts (...) from traditional ecology have been used to generate new insight into microbial communities, and novel system-level models developed to explain and predict microbial interactions. The process of moving from molecular inventories to functional understanding is complex and challenging, and never more so than when many thousands of dynamic interactions are the phenomena of interest. We outline the process of how epistemic transitions are made from producing catalogues of molecules to achieving functional and predictive insight, and show how those insights not only revolutionize what is known about biological systems but also about how to do biology itself. Examples will be drawn primarily from analyses of different human microbiota, which are the microbial consortia found in and on areas of the human body, and their associated microbiomes (the genes of those communities). Molecular knowledge of these microbiomes is transforming microbiological knowledge, as well as broader aspects of human biology, health and disease. (shrink)

In “Punishment as a Costly Signal of Reform,” Jim Staihar argues that prisons should provide inmates with opportunities to sacrifice in ways that signal their genuine reform to others. I first show why Staihar’s program would be valuable, but only in restricted contexts. I then argue that costly signaling programs will usually be either not sufficiently costly to be taken seriously by the signal’s receivers or not rational for inmates in harsh prison environments to complete. Next, I consider the worry (...) that some inmates will choose to participate in costly signaling programs as mimics, rendering ineffective the signals of truly reformed inmates. What Staihar must say, but does not, is why the non-mimicker’s expected utility gain will be sufficiently higher than the mimicker’s such that only sincere participation is incentivized. I conclude by showing why Staihar’s proposal could nevertheless be a valuable part of a hybrid program of legal punishment. (shrink)

In this timely study, Dawes defends the methodological naturalism of the sciences. Though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, the scientist, as scientist, will not take such proposed explanations seriously. Even if no natural explanation were available, she will assume that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? On the one hand, (...) Dawes concedes the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, he argues that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. (shrink)